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THEY SAID IT

“LIVE by old Ethicks and the classical Rules of Honesty. Put no new names or notions upon Authentick Virtues & Vices. Think not that Morality is Ambulatory; that Vices in one age are not Vices in another; or that Virtues, which are under the everlasting Seal of right Reason, may be Stamped by Opinion. And therefore though vicious times invert the opinions of things, and set up a new Ethicks against Virtue, yet hold thou unto old Morality; & rather than follow a multitude to do evil, stand like Pompey’s Pillar conspicuous by thy self, and single in Integrity. And since the worst of times afford imitable Examples of Virtue; since no Deluge of Vice is like to be so general, but more than eight will escape; Eye well those Heroes who have held their Heads above Water, who have touched Pitch, and not been defiled, and in the common Contagion have remained uncorrupted.”

--Sir Thomas Browne, *Christian Morals*, 1716.

In this Issue

The Democrats’ Dilemma

Slouching Away from Gomorrah

End Notes

THE DEMOCRATS’ DILEMMA.

Several weeks ago, I wrote an article entitled “Victory Blueprint for Dems in ‘08” in which I offered Democrats some very specific advice as to how they could win the next presidential election. This week I thought I would supplement that effort with some general thoughts and observations about American politics, past and present, which I think might also be useful to Democrats as they attempt to plot a course out of the dark wood, to borrow an allusion from Bunyan.

The idea for this effort developed slowly over the past several years as I have watched Democrats struggle to keep their party viable. While engaged in this enterprise I have noticed that two premises keep popping up in their public pronouncements. The first and most prominent of these is that Democrats feel that they need “new ideas” and “new issues” with which to capture the imagination of the American people. The second is that Democrats feel that they need to study and emulate the Republican rise to power.

These two themes came together last week with the announcement of an ambitious plan under which, according to the *Washington Post*, “80 wealthy liberals have pledged to contribute \$1 million or more apiece to fund a network of think tanks and advocacy groups *to compete with the potent conservative infrastructure built up over the past three decades.*” (emphasis added) According to the *Post*, the purpose of these groups would be to generate “new ideas and communication strategies.”

Now this is, on the surface, a good idea, and you have to give Democrats credit for appreciating the fact that the intellectual and factual basis for much of what they say and do is sadly deficient and could use some help from a good think tank or two. But it also indicates a misunderstanding about the origin of the ideas that have powered the Republican rise to majority status and the process by which these ideas became part of a political movement. So with that in mind, I thought I would offer a little background on this topic and then try to apply it to the problems Democrats are having today.

For starters, it is important to understand that the beliefs that formed the basis for conservatism's slow rebound from virtual extinction during the Roosevelt years did not arise out of think tanks and advocacy groups established during the past three decades.

In fact, they began to enter the public consciousness over a half century ago, in the mid 1940s and early 1950s, via numerous books written by a handful of intellectuals who were attempting to call attention to the perniciousness of certain social, economic, and political trends that seemed destined to occupy a central role in the post-World War II world.

These works included F.A. Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom* (1944), George Orwell's *Animal Farm* (1945) and *1984* (1949), Richard Weaver's *Ideas Have Consequences* (1948), Peter Viereck's *Conservatism Revisited* (1949), William Buckley's *God and Man at Yale* (1951), Whittaker Chambers' *Witness* (1952), Russell Kirk's *The Conservative Mind* (1953), and Robert Nisbet's *The Quest for Community* (1953).

Together, these and other similar works provided an historical, philosophical, economic, sociological, governmental, and practical catechism upon which to build a political movement. Each author took a different tack, but the common thread among them was alarm at the growing influence of leftist thought in America and a desire to describe the consequences that would result if Americans sacrificed the customs, mores, morals, and governing principles that had formed the basis of their society on the altar of the collectivist ideology of communism and socialism.

Space does not permit even a cursory review of these works, but the following paragraph from a later book by Russell Kirk entitled *The Roots of American Order* (1974) provides an insight into the patrimony, as Kirk called it, of the ideas that these men were putting before the American people.

The roots of [American] order twist back to the Hebrew perceptions of a purposeful moral existence under God. They extend to the philosophical and political self-awareness of the old Greeks. They are nurtured by the Roman experience of law and social organization. They are entwined with the Christian understanding of human duties and human hopes, of man redeemed. They are quickened by medieval custom, learning, and valor. They grip the religious ferment of the sixteenth century. They come from the ground of English liberty under law, so painfully achieved. They are secured by a century and half of community in colonial America. They benefit from the debates of the eighteenth century. They approach the surface through Declaration and Constitution. They emerge full of life from the ordeal of the Civil War.

And the following paragraph from the forward of *Conservatism Revisited* provides a glimpse into the practical concerns that energized these men.

None the less, "liberal" has certain enduring connotations that apply to both the Gladstonian liberal and the modern anticapitalist liberal. It connotes an optimistic secular religion of progress; sometimes, but not always, shallowly hedonistic; surely generous and sincere yet striking the conservative as often blind to the lessons of history. Frequently the real difference between liberal and conservative is in their reaction to such problems as: tempo of social change; need for tradition; confidence in modern technics; faith in the masses and in the natural goodness

of man; feasibility of changing human nature; importance of utilitarian motives (economics vs. “ideas” in history); risk of extending full democratic privileges even to those engaged in forcibly destroying democracy; conflict between liberty and a leveling equality; absoluteness or relativeness of existing restraints and standards.

As I indicated earlier, while these books were brimming over with political fireworks, they were not inspired by retail politics. They did not spring forth from polls, or think tanks, or from a conscious plan to advance the fortunes of a particular political party.

Indeed, the *de facto* politicization of this intellectual movement did not occur until 1960 when Barry Goldwater published a book entitled *The Conscience of a Conservative*, as a prelude to a run at the White House in 1964. Goldwater’s little volume was a distillation of many of the ideas and beliefs set forth in the books mentioned above, restated and reformulated for the purpose of translating them into a governing philosophy that would attract the attention of the voting public. It was a paean to limited government, a maximum amount of freedom, and a tough approach to communism generally and the Soviet Union specifically.

The result was that Goldwater suffered one of the worst defeats in the history of presidential politics at the hands of Lyndon Johnson, one of American history’s most liberal presidents. The message contained in this defeat was that conservatism was not ready for prime time. Practical problems abounded. Among other things, the dire consequences that conservatives predicted would result from liberalism were a long way from becoming evident to most Americans. Just as importantly, while conservatives had an excellent intellectual base from which to build a political machine, they had made no real effort to develop specific approaches to specific problems that were in keeping with their philosophy and that would, at the same time, be competitive with the kind of enthusiastic liberal approaches promoted by the likes of Lyndon Johnson.

In the real world of politics, it took 16 years from the time Goldwater went down in defeat before conservatives hailed the election of Ronald Reagan, America’s first truly conservative, modern president, and 28 years before they witnessed the take-over of the leadership of both Houses of Congress by the Republican Party.

Now it is probably true that the think tanks and advocacy groups that Republicans established during this time to develop and promote their political agenda played a big part in this long march through the institutions of government. But looking back, it seems to me that the driving force all along the way was that the dire forecasts of the intellectuals mentioned above slowly but ever so surely began to come true.

As the roots of liberalism sank deeper and deeper into American soil, society coarsened, and then coarsened more, and then more. Americans witnessed skyrocketing increases in crime, drug abuse, family disintegration, venereal disease, abortions, corruption in politics and business, government waste, and teenage pregnancy. Education standards dropped like a stone. Pornography became one of the nation’s most thriving enterprises. Religion came under public attack in the courts and became a subject of ridicule by society’s liberal elites. The result was that an increasing number of Americans didn’t like what they were seeing, and determined that the source of this societal decay was liberalism, just as Republicans had been saying for over a half a century.

Now, in my opinion, the take home message from all of this for Democrats is that the fundamental problem they face has nothing to do with a shortage of either ideas or effective advocacy groups. In fact, a look back over the past several decades shows that the Democrats have won one important battle after another on behalf of their “ideas,” and in the last half a century they have never run into a shortage of new ones.

Among other things, Democrats won the battle for abortion on demand and have held their ground for decades. They have won countless battles to rid the public square of religion. They have won battle after

battle to lower the standards for public decency to the point where hardcore pornography is now available to virtually any child who has access to the Internet, filthy language is commonplace in all venues, and the President of the United States is excused for having sex with a young intern in the Oval Office of the White House and then lying about it under oath. They have won innumerable fights over the years to weaken the influence of the family, the church, and private charities. Indeed, the list of Democratic victories in their war to destroy the ancient foundations upon which traditional American society has been built goes on and on, *ad nauseam*.

No, the problem Democrats face has nothing to do with either a lack of ideas or the wherewithal to peddle them to the American public. As such, their future is unlikely to be brightened by the establishment of a few new think tanks to come up with a few new ideas that could be sold by a few new advocacy groups.

In fact, the immediate problem that Democrats face is that they have been too successful in promoting their “ideas.” They have won so many battles over the years to impose their very different belief system on the American public that they have created a decency backlash, a repugnancy backlash, a yearning among Americans for a touch of civility and yes, “family values.”

In my humble opinion, what Democrats need to do is engage the enemy on the real battlefield in this conflict. They need to develop and implement a plan to convince the American public that the society that they strive to create is better than the one that their “ideas” are destroying. Among other things, they need to stand tall and unashamedly argue that traditional “family values” are archaic, destructive even, and constitute a terrible attack on the tenets of political correctness. They also need to develop an intellectual and philosophical foundation for their arguments to rival the conservative one I described above. I can’t provide much help on this because I am no expert on liberalism’s foundational documents and heroes. But I would recommend starting with Marx’s *Das Capital* and Huxley’s *Brave New World*. But that’s just a thought, not an “idea.”

SLOUCHING AWAY FROM GOMORRAH.

For at least the past couple of decades, conservatives of various stripes have argued, sometimes rather persuasively, that American civil society is collapsing, that the nation is, to borrow a phrase from one of the more brilliant and best known proponents of the theory, “slouching toward Gomorrah.”

The breakdown of society, according to those who have made such arguments, can be seen in such things as increases in crime, unwed pregnancy, abortions, divorce, and a whole array of other social trends that suggest that modern America – like much of the rest of the modern West – has come loose from its moral moorings and begun the slow and irreversible decline into degradation and decadence.

Naturally, there is much to recommend such lamentations, most notably the fact that they are often accurate. In many cases and on many subjects, there has, indeed, been a palpable coarsening of society, and to argue otherwise would be foolish at best.

That said, a funny thing – or a handful of funny things, to be more accurate – has happened over the last ten to fifteen years that calls into question at least part of these “hell-in-a-hand-basket” expectations for America’s future. Since roughly the mid 1990s, a number of the trends that first provoked this conservative backlash have begun to move in the opposite direction, reversing course, often in the face of well-informed and well-reasoned predictions to the contrary. Two weeks ago, *New York Times* columnist (and token conservative) David Brooks noted this change of direction in many social trends in a piece entitled, “The Virtues of Virtue.” Brooks wrote thusly:

According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the rate of family violence in this country has dropped by more than half since 1993 . . . The decline in domestic violence is of a piece with the decline in violent crime over all. Violent crime over all is down by 55

percent since 1993 and violence by teenagers has dropped an astonishing 71 percent, according to the Department of Justice.

The number of drunken driving fatalities has declined by 38 percent since 1982, according to the Department of Transportation, even though the number of vehicle miles traveled is up 81 percent. The total consumption of hard liquor by Americans over that time has declined by over 30 percent.

Teenage pregnancy has declined by 28 percent since its peak in 1990. Teenage births are down significantly and, according to the Alan Guttmacher Institute, the number of abortions performed in the country has also been declining since the early 1990's.

Fewer children are living in poverty, even allowing for an uptick during the last recession. There's even evidence that divorce rates are declining, albeit at a much more gradual pace. People with college degrees are seeing a sharp decline in divorce, especially if they were born after 1955.

I could go on. Teenage suicide is down. Elementary school test scores are rising (a sign that more kids are living in homes conducive to learning). Teenagers are losing their virginity later in life and having fewer sex partners. In short, many of the indicators of social breakdown, which shot upward in the late 1960's and 1970's, and which plateaued at high levels in the 1980's, have been declining since the early 1990's.

Some critics have suggested that Brooks "cherry-picked" social trends and statistics, citing only those that tended to confirm his hypothesis about a renewal of "virtue." This, in turn, means that a more comprehensive sampling of social data might show that society is not quite as healthy or becoming as

"virtuous" as Brooks would have us believe. And that may well be true. But that doesn't change the fact that a number of vital measures of social health in this country, particularly those related to sexual morality and the importance of the traditional family, are today moving in a positive direction, after roughly three decades of decline. Moreover, since this reversal flies in the face of "expert" predictions, it suggests that there may be a broader and heretofore undetected or unheralded social dynamic at work, pushing American society in completely unexpected directions, thereby confounding many of the nation's political and cultural elites.

Brooks, for his part, appears to believe that the reason for the reversal of these trends is a long overdue shift in attitudes regarding the extreme hedonism that has characterized American youth culture since the 1960s. He rightly recognizes a rejection of the "culture of divorce," and a new and open hostility to "stupid ideas," namely "that the traditional family is obsolete, that drugs are liberating, [and] that it is every adolescent's social duty to be a rebel." And from this he appears to conclude that the broader trend at work here is a rejection of the anything goes, "if-it-feels-good-do-it" attitude toward social behavior that was spawned by the 1960s "Counter Culture" revolution.

There is little question that this explanation is accurate, as far as it goes. In retrospect, it appears perfectly obvious given the damage that such attitudes did to the fabric of American society that there was bound to be some blowback. But I suspect that there is something even larger than this at work here.

In my estimation, what Brooks either doesn't realize or simply doesn't acknowledge is that this blowback is aimed not merely at the "attitude" of '60s liberalization, but at the perpetrators of that liberalization as well. Those rebelling against the "culture of divorce" and "stupid ideas" are rebelling as well against those who advocated no-fault divorce irrespective of the impact on families and society and who insisted that their youthful stupidity was not stupid long after it was rational to concede otherwise. In short, then, the broader social dynamic at work in

the reversal of so many erstwhile discouraging societal trends is the growing social irrelevance of the Baby Boomers, or at the very least the acknowledgment that the Baby Boom generation was a true social aberration that affected the culture deeply for some thirty years but whose ultimate impact on society will be far less than almost anyone expected.

Now, I understand that even the mere insinuation that the Baby Boomers might not have changed society forever sounds completely counterintuitive, particularly to Boomers. For better than half a century now, the idea that the post-war boom generation is “exceptional” has been a virtual article of faith in the American consciousness. It was, of course, the largest generational cohort in the nation’s history and, given its size, was one that created (and continues to create) extraordinary challenges and opportunities. The sheer size of the cohort, the historically unprecedented wealth and leisure of the post-war period, and the resultant indulgence of many Baby Boomer children all combined to produce a generation that believed deeply in its own uniqueness and importance and had little trouble convincing much of the rest of the nation of the same.

Add to this the fact that the Boomers’ first foray into civic action was their involvement in the Civil Rights movement, which understandably bestowed upon them a sense of righteousness, and there is little question how they came to see themselves as possessing a moral as well as demographic exceptionality. Of course, the problem with all of that self-satisfied confidence was that the Boomers’ subsequent forays into civic action neither carried the moral weight of Civil Rights movement nor produced results anywhere near as constructive.

Indeed, in most cases, the overwhelming preponderance of their self-righteous social insurrections was remarkably destructive. Sexual “liberation” contributed in no small part to a dramatic rise in unwed and teen pregnancies; recreational and experimental drug use unleashed a plague on this country largely unparalleled even among developed nations; abortion on demand helped erode respect

for life and traditional notions of responsibility, while labeling abortion a woman’s “right” distracted attention from other vital “women’s” issues, including sexual exploitation and pornography; no-fault divorce and unmarried “cohabitation” further damaged notions of responsibility and commitment; and all of these things combined to undermine traditional social structures and institutions, most notably the family.

As Mark notes above, the hedonistic and socially destructive instincts of the Baby Boomer liberals were hardly unique, similar tendencies having been identified in their ideological ancestors by the likes of Russell Kirk, F.A. Hayek, and William F. Buckley. But a combination of circumstances, including the massiveness of the Boomer cohort, the rapidly changing face of the American social landscape, and the general, global ascendance of the social-welfare policy model, made the Boomers’ instincts more dangerous, more powerful, and ultimately more destructive. The Boomers’ self-indulgence was not all that different from that of previous generations of liberals except in that Boomers had the demographic clout to exploit their circumstances and thereby to incorporate their profligacy into the mainstream of society.

Many Baby Boomers still obsessed with the self-indulgence of their youth insist that they “changed the world” in the 1960s. And indeed they did. Unfortunately, a great many of their changes were devastating to the social fabric of the nation. Many of the successes that might have been achieved by the “War on Poverty” and the “Great Society” were almost certainly negated by the Boomers’ sanctimonious and self-indulgent war on traditional social structures. Today, the marital status of a child’s parents is the greatest single predictor of the likelihood that he or she will be raised in poverty. Indeed, according to a 2002 study by the Heritage Foundation’s Patrick Fagan and Robert Patterson, “more than 80 percent of long-term child poverty occurs among children reared in never-married or broken families.” And poverty is just the tip of the iceberg with regard to the problems exacerbated by the destruction of the traditional family. To wit:

Compared to children born within marriage, children born outside of marriage are overwhelmingly more likely to live in poverty, depend on welfare, and have behavior problems. They are also more likely to suffer depression and physical abuse, fail in school, abuse drugs, and end up in jail.

The only real surprise in all of this is that some of the ill effects of the late '60s social revolutions appear not to be permanent. As I noted at the top of this piece, many of those who study social phenomena had assumed that the negative trends inaugurated by the Baby Boomers were irreversible. But that appears not to be so in all cases.

Naturally, a great many Baby Boomers were not party to the self-indulgent destructiveness of the 1960s and a great many of those who were eventually grew up and recognized the folly of their youth. Equally important, subsequent generations witnessed the destruction wrought by the Boomers' decadence and made concerted efforts to avoid similar mistakes. Some of those generations, including many of the Boomers' own children, have suffered the consequences of their parent's irresponsibility and appear, in turn, to have rebelled against that.

Seven years ago, in one of our better remembered yet surprisingly uncontroversial pieces, Mark and I noted the emergence of a generational cohort roughly equal in size to the Baby Boom cohort, the 70 million-strong "Millennium Generation." Among other things, we predicted that the Millennium Generation, like the Boomers before them, would "affect this nation's political and financial scenery in unprecedented ways" and that "whoever has the forethought to predict what the Millennium Generation will want" will be enormously successful.

What we couldn't have known at the time is that what a great many of these Millennium kids, a significant proportion of whom are the children of Boomers (the so-called "Baby Boom echo"), appear to want is simply for their lives to be less painful, less dramatic,

and more "normal"; for things to be more like they were before the radical hedonism of the 1960s destroyed the "boring" virtue of traditional American society.

The very fact that a number of previously negative social trends have turned around and shown progress over the last decade-and-a-half suggests that their permanence and intractability were almost certainly overestimated. The damage wrought by the social dislocation associated with the Baby Boomers' coming of age was indeed severe, but there is reason at least to be hopeful that it was also merely temporary. The conventional wisdom has always served to confirm the Boomers' conceit that they "changed everything," and changed it forever. The fact that there appears to be evidence to the contrary is, to say the least, a social development of potentially enormous proportion.

But it is also a political development of enormous proportion. Though the leaders of the party are generally loath to concede as much openly, the Democratic Party has fairly openly embraced the values of the Counter Culture revolution since roughly 1972. To this day, party honchos, including its four most recent presidential nominees (Bill Clinton, twice; Al Gore; and John Kerry) and its current chairman, revel in the decadence of their youth and proudly embrace the idea that they changed the world.

Though many of their fellow Boomers have moved on and abandoned their nostalgic fantasies, too many in the Democratic Party appear unwilling to concede that perhaps the 1960s weren't the halcyon days they remember. They refuse to acknowledge the damage done by abortion, by sexual "liberation," by rampant divorce, and by patent disregard for traditional moral and social norms. And they've paid a price for this stubbornness at the polls. In my post-election analysis last November, I offered Democrats a word of advice along the following lines:

Democrats should seriously consider removing any and all liberal Baby Boomers from positions of power and responsibility within the party. And certainly they should

never consider nominating one for President again. I know that their ranks would be pretty thin should they do this. But as long as the overbearing, time-warp-trapped aging hippy Boomers continue to dominate the ranks of the party's leadership, Americans will be reminded of the dreadful impact that these self-absorbed goofballs have had on the nation and the politics of the left . . .

If the liberal Boomers can't get rid of the bongos, the tie-dye, the guitars, the Jimi Hendrix albums, and their obsession with events that took place 35 years ago, then maybe its time for the Democratic party to get rid of them. Heed your own advice, folks. Move on.

The first round of the Democrats' fall from power took place in the early 1970s, when many older, traditional Democrats – Roosevelt Democrats, if you will – saw the Party's embrace of the Counter Culture and decided that their values and those of the party no longer accommodated one another. Like Reagan, these erstwhile longtime Democrats believed that their switch in partisan allegiance was the result of their party having left them.

The second round took place in the late '80s and early '90s, when a number of Baby Boomers looked at their demographic cohorts who were running the Democratic Party and had no choice but to conclude that those folks had never grown up, never would grow up, and thus would never quite give up the self-indulgence of their youth, despite its obvious deleterious effect on society. Bill Clinton may well be a brilliant politician, but he is also the very personification of Baby Boomer self-absorption and hedonism, and his stewardship of the party almost certainly drove a great many Democrats, including a considerable number of his less emotionally stunted fellow Boomers, into the arms of the Republicans.

The third great round of the Democrats' fall is still in its infancy and may not develop fully. But clearly the "Republicanization" of the Millennium Generation is

one of the principle goals of folks like Karl Rove, Ken Mehlman, President Bush, and the others who hope to consolidate the Republican realignment. Public opinion data shows that today's "youth voters" are far more conservative than their parents on a whole host of issues, including abortion. If they can capitalize upon that relative conservatism, then Republicans may well succeed in their goal of establishing themselves as the nation's semi-permanent majority party.

It is worth noting along these lines that the great hope of the Democratic Party, the "rock star" in the otherwise forgettable field of early presidential wannabes, may not be the savior her fellow partisans expect her to be, in part because she happens to be more closely associated with values of the Baby Boomer Counter Culture than just about anyone else on the political scene.

Though Senator Clinton appears to possess many political skills and tremendous political instincts and has thus far managed her post-White House career brilliantly, the fact of the matter is that in addition to being the spouse and chief enabler of the self-indulgent Baby Boomer president named above, she was an early and unrelenting radical feminist; was a student activist and nationally recognized "radical celebrity"; helped defend the New Haven Nine (who were Black Panthers) against murder charges; and even helped draft the articles of impeachment against President Nixon. In short she is the quintessential liberal Baby Boomer.

It is far too early to say whether the blowback against the Baby Boomers' social liberalism will spell Hillary's doom. But clearly her liberal Boomer credentials are not going to help her, in large part because those who revere her for her liberal radicalism are decreasing in number, and those who are openly hostile to her for the same reasons appear to be growing.

In any case, American society still suffers from a number of serious problems, many of which are documented by Mark above, and the source of which is the destructive liberalism that took root in the 1960s. Some of these trends appear to be on the

mend, however, which suggests that while liberals may, as Mark suggests, have won many of the battles over ideas over the last four decades, they may not be able to carry this winning streak much further into the future. And that may be the most important positive social development of all.

END NOTES. The Force Behind Liberal Think Tanks.

As Mark notes in the opening piece in this week's newsletter, the Democratic establishment has recently made a concerted effort to fund the development of a handful of liberal think tanks to compete with the extremely successful Republican versions. Though it is rarely mentioned in any discussion of these new Democratic think tanks, the subtext here is the continuing decline in the relevance and excellence of the American academy.

It is worth noting here that the conservative think tanks the Democrats want so desperately to imitate were, essentially, an outgrowth of the radical liberal takeover of American academia. Understanding that the existing intellectual institutions were no longer conducive to the honing of conservative ideas and the development of policy prescriptions based on those ideas, conservatives simply set about to create new institutions. The success of these new institutions almost certainly exceeded initial expectations, as they have, indeed, provided a reasonably effective conservative counter to liberal academia.

The fact that today's liberals are so dissatisfied with the quality of ideas and policy proposals being generated by America's universities that they would seek to create their own new institutions suggests not that the universities have become less liberal (they have almost certainly not) but that the quality of scholarship in the academic social sciences has decreased dramatically. Whereas liberal academia once produced truly brilliant (if occasionally wrong) prominent policy theorists like Daniel Patrick Moynihan, it now tends to produce hacks like Paul Krugman and Ward Churchill, who at times appear more guided by ideology than by the aspiration to intellectual excellence.

Mark and I have long noted the decline of the American education system, and, indeed, Mark makes reference to it again in his piece today. Unfortunately, this is one social trend that does not appear to be on the upswing, at least in at the nation's social sciences departments. And even the Democrats seem to have noticed.

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